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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the last twenty-plus years since the end of the Cold War, several states in 
Southeast Asia have increased defense spending on a larger scale than the two preceding 
decades. Some analysts have concluded these expenditures were maintenance of the 
status quo or innocuous modernization efforts; however, the acquisition of submarines by 
several states in Southeast Asia makes recent defense spending patterns different. 
Specifically, the acquisition of submarines is a force multiplier for states that are 
otherwise unable to compete militarily with the likes of China. The adoption of undersea 
capabilities poses several questions, including: What are the motives for states in 
Southeast Asia to acquire submarines? Do these acquisitions represent a shortcut to 
maintain the status quo in the environment of a stronger China and others, or do they 
represent something else? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Military modernization in the decades after the end of the Cold War have 
included the proliferation of modern missile systems, aircraft, surface ships, and 
submarines on a scale that raised the eyebrows of analysts and prompted a significant 
amount of research.1 This time period in Southeast Asia is significant for a number of 
reasons. The first is the combination of the disengagement of the United States and the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, events that signaled to the region that the free-riding 
security guarantees of the major powers were no longer assured. Southeast Asian states 
had to make the choice to either align themselves explicitly with a security guarantor—
which was avoided in the past—or to look to themselves for defense in what is described 
in as early as 1995 as “uncertainty based” defense calculation.2 The second significant 
event in the time period of this research is the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis that derailed a 
                                                 
1 Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military 
Acquisitions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 32, no. 1 (2010): 50–69. 
2 J. N. Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build Up: Implications for the Regional Order,” Pacific Review 8, 
no. 2 (1995): 303–4.  
 2 
number of states looking to modernize their militaries, causing a scaling back of military 
expenditures in the short term.3 As a result, the ebb and flow of defense spending in the 
preceding decades gave analysts yet a third reason to research the time period: Why 
would states in Southeast Asia choose to or decline to continue spending large amounts 
of money on defense? More precisely, why would states make a larger investment in 
submarines? Finally, this time period is significant because China has also pursued a 
substantial military modernization program in the same timeframe, which created 
anxieties within the region. 
On the surface, military modernization in Southeast Asia can be an innocent part 
of status quo modernization efforts or, by contrast, acquiring new arms and equipment 
can be characterized as an open arms competition.4 Yet, the significance of submarine 
proliferation as part of these modernization efforts is that submarines have an inherently 
different character—one that is predatory and rooted in secrecy.5 Thus, the regional 
proliferation of submarines is potentially destabilizing within the larger context of 
defense modernization efforts. Answering the research question will provide insight into 
why states acquire submarines and forecasts what can be done to either quell potential 
fears or make submarine operations safer and less destabilizing. 
The purpose of the research that will follow is to explore why states decided to 
include submarine proliferation as part of their modernization endeavors. For the majority 
of states in Southeast Asia, the acquisition of submarines does not clearly follow patterns 
of status quo modernization and is a new asset in states’ portfolios of weapons 
technologies.6 The significance for Southeast Asia with respect to submarine 
proliferation is that these acquisitions will likely force fundamental changes to defense 
policy that must consider the possibility of an undersea threat.  
                                                 
3 “Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface in SE Asia,” Jane’s Navy International 116, no. 9 
(2011), http://search.proquest.com/docview/896649289?accountid=12702. 
4 Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race,” 52–60. 
5 Aaron Beng, “Submarine Procurement in Southeast Asia: Potential for Conflict and Prospects for 





This thesis can shed light on the scholarly and policy debates regarding military 
modernization and submarine proliferation in Southeast Asia that have serious security 
implications. To this point, exploration and research into military modernization in 
Southeast Asia have weighted submarine acquisitions equally among the menu of 
technologies that have proliferated over the last two decades. Exploring submarine 
proliferation separately from other technologies, however, can provide insight into state 
behavior that might otherwise be difficult to ascertain under the framework of general 
military modernization. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scholarship with respect to military modernization in Southeast Asia not only 
examines the wholesale trends of acquisitions in the region, but also offers sound insights 
into why states may decide to pursue some technologies over others—including where 
submarines may fit into larger defense strategies. First, this review will outline several 
hypotheses that identify the regional concerns driving military modernization more 
generally. Second, this review will identify separate hypotheses in that explain submarine 
proliferation specifically, as opposed to general modernization. Third, this review will 
identify four Southeast Asian cases that will be researched to explain the rationale for 
submarine acquisitions in that geographical area. 
1. Military Modernization 
There are several hypotheses in the existing literature to explain the explosion of 
defense spending for general military modernization and provide background that may 
help explain submarine proliferation, which will be discussed separately. These 
hypotheses are: regional security uncertainties borne from the end of the Cold War, 
creating a need for self-reliant defense; the desire to provide for the indigenous defense of 
territorial waters; and a rising, aggressive Chinese military.7 Each argument is couched in 
some empirical evidence and is worthy of discussion. 
                                                 
7 Richard A. Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of 
Southeast Asia,” Working paper, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, no. 126 (2007): 5–10; 
Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build Up,” 303–4; Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?” 52–60. 
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One hypothesis that may explain the origin of military modernization efforts in 
Southeast Asia post-1991 is that the end of the Cold War brought disengagement by the 
great powers as security guarantors.8 The absence of superpower rivalry, coupled with a 
lack of interest in Southeast Asia as a whole, caused the United States and the now-
defunct Soviet Union to uncouple their security strategies from the region. Furthermore, 
there was a fear that the United States, as the surviving hegemon from the Cold War, 
would be an unreliable ally and only act in its self-interest. The result was states taking a 
greater stake in their own security and accepting modernization of their militaries as a 
necessary condition to guarantee their own security, following the realist logic of self-
help.9 
A second hypothesis in the research is that regional navies want to protect their 
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZs) against not only big power 
interference but also the nontraditional threats of terrorism and piracy, thus requiring a 
modern military to achieve these objectives.10 Patrol craft; command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technology; aircraft; and small arms 
are among the host of military equipment that states purchased to patrol their own 
waterways. As part of Richard A. Bitzinger’s 2010 argument, states such as Malaysia and 
Vietnam are modernizing for this purpose; furthermore, Malaysia established a coast 
guard in 2005 to patrol its EEZ and “safeguard the Malacca Straits from terrorism and 
piracy.”11  
A third prominent hypothesis in the literature is that China, as the regional 
hegemon, dominates the defense anxieties of most states in the region and is the primary 
motivator behind military modernization.12 Both J. N. Mark in as early as 1995 and 
Bitzinger in a working paper from 2007 and article from 2010 ascribe the spike in 
defense spending to a host of causes but recognized that a rising China plays a major role 
                                                 
8 Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome,” 5–10; Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?” 53–54; Mak, “The 
ASEAN Naval Build Up,” 303–4. 
9 Ibid.“”“”“” 
10 Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?,” 53–54. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Mak, “The ASEAN Naval Build Up,” 303–4; Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome,” 5–10. 
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in the buildup of arms and technology in Southeast Asia.13 This hypothesis follows realist 
logic that states in Southeast Asia are recognizing the growing military power 
asymmetries between themselves and China and are seizing the opportunity to close the 
gap in capabilities—although that may be difficult to do considering China’s enormous 
wealth. 
2. Submarine Proliferation 
Separate from the hypotheses to explain military modernization, submarine 
proliferation itself is a different trend requiring further examination. The literature on 
submarine proliferation is focused in large part on individual states’ submarine programs 
and capabilities; yet, examining more literature can help explain the procurement 
rationales for not only those states that have acquired submarines but also others that 
have expressed interest. The prominent hypotheses in the literature to explain submarine 
proliferation include deterrence; enforcement of territorial claims, EEZs, and territorial 
waters; and state prestige.14  
The deterrence hypothesis is pervasive in the literature and argues that the 
purchase of submarines is intended to deter China from operating in the territorial waters 
and EEZs—claimed or otherwise—of states in Southeast Asia, where up to now China 
has been able to operate with relative impunity.15 The logic is that if China knows a state 
has submarines that it may be less adventurous, lest a nearby submarine threaten its ships. 
In a 2011 Jane’s Navy International article, the author cites a former Indian submarine 
commander’s rationale for submarine proliferation that echoes this hypothesis: “‘it is 
inevitable that small regional navies will seek to acquire submarines for their deterrence 
value in the face of a growing People’s Liberation Army Navy and China’s increasing 
                                                 
13 Ibid.; Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?,” 53–54. 
14 “The Submarine Race in Asia,” New York Times, January 7, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/opinion/the-submarine-race-in-asia.html?emc=eta1; John Pomfret, 
“Concerned about China’s Rise, Southeast Asian Nations Build Up Militaries,” Washington Post, August 9, 
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/08/AR2010080802631.html; 
“Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface”; Walter C. Ladwig III, “India and Military Power Projection: 
Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?,” Asian Survey 50, no. 6 (2010): 1167–8; 
Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?,” 63. 
15 “Submarine Race in Asia.” 
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influence.’”16 Furthermore, Jane’s and others argue “a small force of submarines…can 
conduct effective sea denial/anti-access operations because they are force multipliers, 
tying down a disproportionate number of hostile assets.”17 In short, submarines offer an 
opportunity to close the large military gap with China because of their unique deterrent 
value. 
A second hypothesis explaining submarine proliferation is that submarines are an 
enforcement platform in the maritime domain not only in territorial waters and EEZs, but 
also in strategic waterways and territorial claims. The idea behind submarines in this case 
is that because of the vast amount of territory to patrol, submarines provide a cost-
effective method to accomplish this objective while simultaneously providing a form of 
power projection (i.e., showing the flag) in the region to publicly show that the area is 
being monitored by the interested state.18 For example, Vietnam has interests in 
enforcing its territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Indonesia must 
patrol its nearby critical straits and the Celebes Seas, and those governments’ interest in 
submarines may be in support of those desires.  
A third hypothesis to explain submarine proliferation Southeast Asia is prestige. 
This argument follows that states are procuring submarines in a back-and-forth game of 
showing off the latest technology, including submarines, to prove that it is just as capable 
as its competitors.19 For example, Malaysia accelerated its submarine acquisition 
program after Singapore purchased submarines.20 Some researchers are quick to point 
out, however, that these procurements fall short of an arms race and can better be 
described as an arms competition.21 
                                                 
16 “Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface.” 
17 Ibid.; Beng, “Submarine Procurement in Southeast Asia,” 55–60. 
18 “Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface”; Ladwig III, “India and Military Power Projection,” 
1167–8. 
19 Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?” 63. 
20 “Malaysia Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified July 29, 2013, 
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/malaysia-submarine-capabilities/. 
21 Ibid.; 51–52; “Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface”; Beng, “Submarine Procurement in 
Southeast Asia,” 55–63. 
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The case studies selected for this thesis—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam—are those with small, developing submarine fleets and were selected because 
of their geographic location, proximity to other submarine states, and variance. Each state 
provides an opportunity to weigh the importance of several hypotheses across different 
cases with competing state interests. The cases of Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines were excluded for parsimony. Rhetoric and expressed desires alone to acquire 
submarines are insufficient to explain proliferation because the process of purchasing 
specific platforms from a host of suppliers, establishing a maintenance and manning 
program, and operating submarines at sea each provide clearer evidence that can support 
different hypotheses for proliferation. Australia was also excluded as a case study 
because the state’s first six submarines were each built indigenously (far beyond the 
capability of its neighbors) and because of its resemblance to the United States with 
respect to defense policy.22 
3. Indonesia 
Indonesia was the first Southeast Asian state to acquire submarines, with the first 
platform entering service in 1981.23 For Indonesia, the world’s largest archipelagic state, 
patrolling its vast coastline is of utmost importance and its desire to procure submarines 
may reflect several of the hypotheses mentioned above. Underlying Indonesia’s military 
modernization is the reality that the sheer size of Indonesia’s coastline and its proximity 
to a number of critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs) demands a large fleet to 
patrol the area—on the order of hundreds of vessels—of which the navy is far short. In 
short, Indonesia’s size, location, and defense interests make it a compelling case to 
explore submarine proliferation. 
4. Malaysia 
The Malaysian case study bears a number of similarities to the Indonesian and 
Singaporean cases, from territorial disputes in the South China Sea to the desire to protect 
                                                 
22 “Australia Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified July 15, 2013, 
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/australia-submarine-capabilities/. 
23 John Moore, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 1982–83 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), 215–6. 
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its own territorial waters. Although the Asian Financial Crisis derailed prior ambitions of 
purchasing submarines, Malaysia’s program gained momentum after Singapore 
successfully procured submarines—making the prestige hypothesis worth exploration.24 
Furthermore, because Malaysia’s submarines are home ported in Sabah, away from its 
most critical waterways, the acquisition of submarines is curious.25 Eventually, Malaysia 
purchased two new French-made Scorpène-class submarines in 2002 via cash and barter, 
and trained their sailors in France to operate its submarines.26 In short, the Malaysian 
case is worth further exploration because its geopolitics and commitment to procuring 
submarines in the wake of a financial crisis could have precluded significant spending. 
5. Singapore 
Singapore, like its neighbors, considers its proximity to a number of critical 
waterways—namely the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait—to be of prime 
importance.27 Singapore’s small size and important territorial waters commands a great 
deal of responsibility that the Royal Singaporean Navy (RSN) is determined to support. 
Bitzinger described Singapore’s third generation (3G) transformation of its military, 
which aims to leverage C4I to counter nontraditional threats and supports its stated 
objective of protecting its maritime interests.28 Preliminary research suggests that 
Singapore has a deterrent imperative for submarines that will be explored in greater 
detail. In summary, the Singaporean case study is valuable because it is both wealthy and 
small, making it curious that submarines were procured. 
6. Vietnam 
Although Vietnam lacks the proximity to the Malacca and Singapore Straits like 
the other case studies it is the closest Southeast Asian submarine state to China, which is 
                                                 
24 “Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface”; “Malaysia Submarine Capabilities.” 
25 “Malaysia Submarine Capabilities.” 
26 “Underwater Aspirations Break the Surface”; Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome,” 12–15. 
27 “Indonesia Submarine Capabilities,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, last modified August 2, 2013, 
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/indonesia-submarine-capabilities/; Beng, “Submarine Procurement in 
Southeast Asia,” 56. 
28 Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome,” 16–17. 
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one of the adversarial states of concern that this thesis will explore. Like the other case 
studies, Vietnam does share the same emphasis on the sea as part of its national security 
strategy and buoyance of the national economy. John Pomfret, in a 2010 Washington 
Post article, offers his summary of the Vietnam case study: “Experts generally agree that 
Vietnam’s weapons acquisitions program is the most significant because it appears 
singularly focused on deterring China [and] in essence, Vietnam is attempting to make its 
coastal defenses strong enough so that China will think twice about pushing its claims.”29 
Bitzinger identified the disengagement of the United States in the post–Cold War 
environment as further support for Vietnam’s self-reliance strategy to deter China, in 
which submarines play a part.30 Vietnam is a compelling case study for this thesis 
because preliminary research suggests that China a singular focus for its submarine 
program. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The scope and depth of this thesis will allow the exploration of each hypothesis 
across the selected case studies. The hypotheses to explain military modernization as a 
baseline for submarine acquisition include state self-defense after the Cold War, a rising 
China, and the requirement for indigenous defense of territorial waters. The hypotheses 
selected for further research to explain submarine proliferation in Southeast Asia include 
deterrence, enforcement of states’ maritime interests, and exhibition of state prestige. 
The first hypothesis that this thesis will investigate to explain military 
modernization is that following the Cold War, states decided that modernizing their 
militaries was necessary for self-defense because protection provided by the superpowers 
was no longer a guarantee. Second, many Southeast Asian states identify the importance 
of the sea to the economy and the necessity of unimpeded commerce to patrol territorial 
waters. The third hypothesis of a rising Chinese military power asymmetry, which 
mandates that states modernize their militaries, will also be explored. 
                                                 
29 Pomfret, “Concerned about China’s Rise.”  
30 Bitzinger, “The China Syndrome,” 20. 
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The first hypothesis for submarine proliferation that this thesis will investigate is 
that submarines are being acquired to deter regional military threats. Specifically, China 
is often identified as the regional hegemon that creates the biggest insecurities for 
Southeast Asian nations. Researchers offer strong evidence to support the China 
deterrence hypothesis and it will be explored in more detail. A second hypothesis 
requiring further research is that states purchased submarines to enforce their territorial 
claims and EEZs, and that submarines are a form of power projection to achieve this 
objective. 
The third hypothesis selected for this thesis to explain submarine proliferation is 
state prestige. Although some researchers suggest that submarines can be used to gather 
intelligence, deter larger militaries, and patrol vast expanses of territory, the national 
security objectives of the cases examined all identify the importance of the maritime 
domain as it relates to commerce.31 Using this logic, keeping vital waterways open for 
business is the prime objective. Short of preventing other submarines from sinking cargo 
vessels, submarines—in this case—are weak assets compared to law enforcement or 
coast guard vessels to stop piracy and terrorism. Although submarines do possess a robust 
mission set, the primary mission of hunting other submarines remains the most vital. 
Thus, a more persuasive hypothesis might be prestige. This argument follows the logic 
that developed states with advanced militaries have submarines and that smaller states, 
looking to be viewed in the same light, are spending large amounts of money for a 
relatively modest purpose. In the case of Malaysia, for example, its submarine 
proliferation program was ratcheted up after Singapore procured its first submarines, 
spending more than US$1 billion for two platforms—a rather small improvement.32 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will examine the overall themes present in the scholarship concerning 
submarine proliferation and evaluate their potency against four case studies within 
Southeast Asia, with the selected states hosting submarine programs and having stated 
                                                 
31 Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race?” 63; Beng, “Submarine Procurement in Southeast Asia,” 56–60. 
32 Pomfret, “Concerned about China’s rise.” 
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their interest in submarines. Specifically, this thesis will compare the cases of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. The comparative method of this research is intended 
to provide an empirical assessment of each hypothesis against the selected cases. 
Furthermore, this research method avoids biasing the data to support a single case (e.g., 
Vietnam’s program as a response to counter China’s regional aggression), and instead 
allows an examination of the strength of the selected hypotheses across a diverse 
spectrum of cases with varied national interests and histories.33 This thesis is not intended 
to identify a winner among the competing hypotheses, but rather to identify the strongest 
argument for each case and determine what, if any, patterns exist. 
This thesis will gather evidence from a wide range of resources to include reports 
from relevant conferences hosted by both academic and international institutions—e.g., 
ASEAN, RSIS; reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs); journal and 
newspaper articles; think tank reports; working papers and op-eds; and relevant books. 
This thesis will not include human subjects because the scope of the research will not 
permit gathering individual data or soliciting opinions of foreign military members and 
government officials. The selection of the stated resources allows the research to cover a 
broad spectrum of information from both inside and outside government while 
simultaneously providing sufficient depth to answer the research question. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis first addresses the research questions and their importance to the 
available scholarship with respect to submarine proliferation and regional security 
studies. Chapter I identifies the themes from the research with respect to states’ rationales 
for acquiring submarines in the contemporary security environment. After identifying the 
relevant hypotheses, the thesis devotes a chapter to each case study. The case study 
chapters provide an overview of the security issues the state has faced and a timeline that 
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shows the progression of its submarine program. Each case study then examines the 
robustness of the ‘Chapter I’s findings against the backdrop of that state’s national 
security goals and interests, using empirics to support or refute each hypothesis. The end 
of each chapter identifies the strongest arguments present in that specific case. The 
thesis’s conclusion aggregates the first chapter’s findings across the case studies and 
presents an argument that best answers the research questions and can best forecast other 





Indonesia was the first state in Southeast Asia to operate submarines, with its first 
submarine entering service in the early 1960s, and the size and capacity of its submarine 
fleet has ebbed and flowed in the last fifty years to reflect the dominant security 
challenges and financial situation of the time. Indonesia’s submarine-seeking behavior 
has sought to leverage several low-intensity conflicts and crises into existential threats 
that mandated the costly purchase of more submarines. Yet, only small-scale endeavors 
to acquire submarines have succeeded to date. 
B. BACKGROUND/COLD WAR ERA 
After declaring its independence in 1945, Indonesia made significant efforts to 
modernize its military that included acquiring submarines. In 1961, Indonesia reached an 
agreement to buy 12 Whiskey-class submarines from the Soviet Union as part of a larger 
arms deal that included hardware for the army and air force.34 At its peak in 1963, the 
Indonesian submarine fleet was said to have as many as 20 Whiskey-class submarines; 
however, only 12 years later, in 1975, the number of operational platforms numbered as 
few as two.35 Indonesian planners were inadequately prepared to train submariners and to 
build the necessary infrastructure to maintain their submarines, and underestimated the 
extent of the necessary tropicalization modifications that the Soviet-built submarines 
required.36 Furthermore, the hulls were purchased secondhand and thus had a shortened 
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life cycle upon delivery. The plan to acquire submarines was successful yet the 
integration and maintenance of these platforms was ill conceived.  
In 1977, Indonesia purchased two new Type-209-class submarines from East 
Germany, which entered into service in 1981 as the Cakra-class, with plans for four 
additional platforms.37 The German submarines came at just the right time for the aging 
fleet; however, plans for the additional four hulls were scrapped following an Indonesian 
economic crisis in the late 1970s, the enormous cost of refit for the two existing Cakra-
submarines in the late 1980s, and concerns about the suitability of the design for future 
use.38 Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, no further submarine negotiations took 
place and refitting its existing submarine fleet was the priority. 
The Cold War era of Indonesian submarine purchases were the most robust in 
Southeast Asia and were likely procured for the purposes of deterrence with respect to the 
1961 deal and prestige in the case of the 1977 deal. At the time of the 1961 submarine 
purchases, Indonesia recalled its war with the Dutch for independence and anticipated 
that future conflict in New Guinea would require more formidable hardware, and an 
argument can be made that the rationale for the purchase of submarines at this time were 
to deter its more powerful, familiar foe.39 After the 1961 military hardware agreement 
with the Soviet Union, Indonesian defense minister Abdul Ilaris Nasution, presented the 
rationale for the deal—which included submarines: “the Dutch recently have 
strengthened their armed force in West Irian (West New Guinea) and have carried out all 
kinds of provocations, so there is no other way for Indonesia to save itself except by 
building up the strength of its armed forces.”40 The border conflict with Malaysia on the 
island of Borneo in the mid-1960s further reinforced that deterrence was necessary. For 
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Indonesian president Sukarno, the formation of Malaysia in close proximity was a direct 
threat to Indonesia and required a formidable deterrence because “Indonesia is ‘encircled 
by enemies’”; Defense Minister Nasution echoed Sukarno’s assessment: “to the north of 
us neocolonialism is moving toward what has been described as an encirclement of 
Indonesia.”41 When Indonesia considered the security situation in its immediate vicinity, 
the environment was dangerous enough to demand submarines for deterrence. 
The Pertamina oil and financial crisis in the late 1970s that preceded the purchase 
of the two Type-209 submarines in 1977 supported prestige as the rationale for that 
purchase because of funding shortages and because Indonesia lacked a legitimate military 
adversary after its border conflict with Malaysia was settled. Furthermore, Indonesia’s 
state-owned Pertamina oil company provided funding for the military and after its decline 
likely made such a large purchase almost prohibitive.42 First, between the mid-1960s and 
1977, the Indonesian submarine fleet was rapidly shrinking and its precipitous decline 
highlighted the technical difficulty in maintaining an operational submarine fleet.43 In 
other words, the Indonesian submarine program had a short half-life and was expensive. 
Second, up to 1977, the most noteworthy accomplishment of the fleet was in August 
1965, when approximately thirty Indonesian Special Forces were deployed during an 
amphibious raid from a submarine, and five were captured by the Dutch; the relative 
success of that operation earned the crew of the submarine a prestigious medal.44 A third 
piece of evidence that advanced the prestige argument was articulated by Indonesian Rear 
Admiral Agung Pramono when he described Indonesia’s Cold War submarines: “superb 
underwater units,” “serving as a source of pride and self confidence for her people,” and 
that “the Navy expects to restore the glory of its naval forces, including its submarine 
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squadron.”45 It is difficult to argue that the Cold War era hulls were wildly successful, let 
alone that their utility matched their cost. 
C. POST–COLD WAR ERA 
At the close of the Cold War, Indonesia was the only state in Southeast Asia that 
operated submarines.46 In the two decades that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
several arguments were made to increase the size of the submarine fleet, even to as many 
as thirty-five hulls according to a former Indonesian military chief in 2002.47 
Negotiations started up again in the mid-1990s only to be derailed by the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis; later negotiations gained momentum after the state recovered from the 
crisis and Indonesia is on track to take delivery of a new submarine by 2020.48 
In the mid-1990s, negotiations took place with Germany for up to a half dozen 
more Type-209 submarines that only resulted in the delivery of two second hand hulls in 
September 1997, which were never refit nor integrated into the fleet because the program 
was defunded and cancelled.49 In 2005, another proposed deal with Germany for 
additional Type-209 submarines via a trade agreement was discussed but never came to 
fruition.50 Next, in 2007, Indonesia signed an agreement to purchase two Kilo-class 
submarines as part of a US$1.2 billion military loan from Russia.51 Indonesian Defense 
Ministry Spokesman, Brigadier General Edy Butar Butar, confirmed the Russian deal and 
gave a brief explanation: “we still have two submarines we bought from Germany a long 
time ago, and now we are waiting for two submarines from Russia; so I would really like 
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to have more than four submarines.”52 In parallel with the Russian proposal, Indonesia 
entered into negotiations for three Chang Bogo-class submarines from South Korea’s 
Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering and announced the deal in December 2011, 
which stipulated that Indonesia’s PT PAL would build one of the submarines 
indigenously.53 The Russian deal fizzled but the South Korean deal appears to be on track 
with the first hull to be delivered between 2018 and 2020.54 
In the case of post–Cold War submarine negotiations, Indonesian leaders 
considered deterrence and enforcement as rationales for submarine procurement, 
although the evidence overwhelmingly pointed to deterrence over enforcement. 
Deterrence as a rationale for submarine purchases requires an adversary that 
defense planners considered in their analysis. Since 1991, the most likely adversarial 
candidates have been Australia and Malaysia. With respect to Australia, the United 
Nations (UN) mission in East Timor (UNMISET) in 1999 resulted in the loss of 
Indonesian territory under an Australian-led UN coalition.55 Shortly after the UNMISET, 
Indonesia’s low-intensity conflict with Malaysia over the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan, 
which were awarded to Malaysia in a 2002 UN International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
resulted in what Indonesia perceived as the loss of its sovereign territory.56 These 
outcomes were significant blows to what Indonesia viewed as its primary national 
security objective, namely defending the territorial integrity of its archipelagic state.57  
One example of a deterrence-minded approach to submarine acquisitions by 
Indonesia is present in its 2007 “Tri Dharma Eka Karma,” a cross-service doctrine that 
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expressed an overall desire to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity, in which 
the navy and submarines have an important role. The document required that the military 
consider “force protection strategies with ‘deterrence’ and ‘denial’ capabilities.”58 
Although the doctrinal statements maintain the primacy of internal defense, the explicit 
acknowledgement of deterrence and denial as a means of achieving homeland defense 
necessitate a force projection capability that would likely include submarines. 
Another example of deterrence exists in statements made about Malaysia in the 
decade after the ICJ’s 2002 ruling on the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan. In 2005, 
Indonesian First Admiral Abdul Maliki Yusuf stated that the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) 
would continue sending warships in the vicinity of two islands to dispute a Malaysian oil 
exploration contract to Shell, and did not rule out deploying a submarine to the area: “it is 
imperative that we also enforce our presence and sovereignty there.”59 Although Admiral 
Yusuf mentions enforcement, which is the second argument in this case, the deployment 
of a submarine to directly respond to Malaysian activity points to deterrence—in which 
submarines are powerful assets. In a 2009 analysis of Indonesia’s security outlook and 
defense policy, Rizal Sukma articulated the concerns of some senior Indonesian officials 
with respect to the territorial dispute with Malaysia and how submarines could be 
involved: 
Indonesia’s procurement policy to a certain degree reflects national 
security concerns, such as the need to protect Indonesia’s territorial 
sovereignty and border security. It is also driven by territorial disputes 
with neighbouring countries, especially Malaysia. When expressing the 
Navy’s interest in purchasing submarines, for example, the Head of 
Information Department of the Navy First Admiral Iskandar Sitompul 
explicitly referred to the “Malaysia factor” and stressed the need for 
Indonesia to acquire submarines with better deterrent effects than the 
Malaysian-owned Scorpene, such as the Russia’s Kilo class. He argued 
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that Indonesia “must possess submarines with greater deterrent effect. If 
they [Malaysians] know we have that, they will be scared.”60 
Sukma’s analysis and the statements by Admirals Sitompul and Yusuf revealed 
that the territorial dispute—which was settled only in part by the ICJ ruling—loomed 
large in the thinking of some senior officials and that the decision to purchase additional 
submarines equipped with better technology was one response to this ongoing dispute.  
Enforcement is the second, albeit weaker, hypothesis to explain Indonesian 
submarine acquisitions strategy since 1991. Statements made by Indonesian officials 
during post–Cold War negotiations reflected an attitude that reinforced the importance of 
protecting Indonesian territory, including claims in disputed areas. In the case of 
enforcement, submarines provide either visible or perceived presence in areas that the 
state holds, or claims to hold, sovereignty over—be it the natural resources therein or the 
waterway itself. Although territorial disputes may escalate and require that the 
submarine’s role transition from enforcement to deterrence, there is some evidence that 
submarine purchases were considered for the purposes of enforcement. 
In April 2005, Aqlani Maza, an arms procurement agent for the Indonesian 
Ministry of Defense, stated that “Indonesia as an archipelagic country needs to acquire 
submarines” under a proposed agreement with Germany for more Type-209 hulls.61 A 
deal with Germany never came to fruition, however, Maza made the case that submarines 
were necessary because of the physical geography of Indonesia. Enforcement is 
necessary to protect vital sea lanes, territorial waters, EEZs, and territorial claims against 
a less-defined threat, and Indonesia’s massive coastline and the areas that it disputes—
Ligitan and Sipadan among others—mandated that submarine be considered for this 
purpose. Furthermore, the statements made by Admiral Yusuf reflected enforcement 
imperatives that submarines could fulfill in addition to deterrence. 
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Another official announcement that supported an enforcement agenda came in 
December 2010 from Deputy Naval Chief of Staff, Vice Admiral Marsetio, when he 
addressed a group of fellow Indonesian military officers: “We need to increase the 
number of submarines…[to] 39 submarines.” Marsetio continued, “as the world’s largest 
archipelagic country, Indonesia saw the urgency to have submarines in adequate numbers 
to protect its maritime sovereignty…[and] the addition of the 39 submarines would 
hopefully help the Indonesian Navy keep the country’s marine territory intact.”62 Given 
the budget difficulties of past years, this target is unlikely to be met but Admiral 
Marsetio’s statements were significant because of the enforcement language.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The evidence suggested that in the post–Cold War environment Indonesia pursued 
additional submarines for deterrence and that deterring Australia and Malaysia were 
significant motivators in Indonesia’s defense calculus. In the wake of two separate losses 
of Indonesian territory, protecting its remaining territory became a greater security 
priority for defense planners and evidence supporting deterrence for this purpose gained 
traction. By 2004, the need for enforcement began to surface in official statements, 
although the evidence supporting that hypothesis was weak. 
                                                 





Malaysia was the third state in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, after 
Indonesia and Singapore respectively. It took delivery of its first submarine in 2007 after 
more than two decades of negotiations, bargaining, setbacks, and even charges of 
corruption in the process.63 To date, the RMN has taken delivery of two submarines, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak, and has made overtures that it desires more 
platforms to meet its territorial challenges and naval ambitions.64  
B. BACKGROUND/COLD WAR ERA 
Malaysia can trace the roots of its submarine program to between 1979 when it 
published the Peta Baru, or “New Map,” which illustrated its territorial waters, 
continental shelf, and maritime claims, and 1982, when the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) gave legal status to its 200 nautical mile EEZ.65 Both of these 
developments compelled the RMN to expand to adequately patrol its territory. In 1980, 
then-Malaysian Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral Mohammed Zain Saleh made the first 
public statement that suggested submarines would be necessary for this endeavor. 
According to Admiral Zain, “the Navy must change its present operational concept from 
that of coastal patrolling to…ocean surveillance,” and submarines were ideal assets to 
fulfill this role, albeit in the long term.66  
Zain’s successor as Chief of the Navy Vice Admiral Datuk Abdul Nawi continued 
to argue the merits of a submarine program: “the acquisition of even one submarine 
would not only be in line with the concept of self reliance but would be a vital first step 
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toward the creation of a well-balanced fleet.”67 The desire for submarines that Zain and 
Nawi articulated permeated multiple levels of naval leadership and was further reflected 
in a 1986 interview with a senior navy staff officer: “acquiring just one submarine, if not 
more, is like introducing an armored capability to what was previously an ‘infantry only’ 
army.”68 In other words, submarines were a requirement for an outward-looking naval 
strategy that the navy was intent on pursuing. 
By the end of the 1980s, negotiations took place for submarine training programs 
and platforms, as well as for new and used hulls, with France, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Sweden, among others.69 As of 1989, Malaysia entertained deals from 
Great Britain’s Vickers Shipbuilding for Oberon-class submarines and Sweden’s 
Kockums shipyard for others. Additionally, Malaysia had been sending sailors to several 
states overseas for submarine training since 1980.70 Yet, on the eve of the end of the Cold 
War in 1991, plans were still “some fifteen years away” according to senior Malaysian 
naval officers with knowledge of the situation.71 
Malaysia’s inability to acquire submarines during the Cold War reflected not only 
the short planning window but also the security dynamics of the era. Before the 1979 Peta 
Baru, Malaysia was focused on internal security challenges that maintained primacy over 
any external threat that might have encouraged the purchase of submarines. After 1979, 
Malaysian defense planners identified the need for seaward defense and ocean 
surveillance, as Zain articulated. Yet, the U.S. military presence and Five Power Defence 
                                                 
67 “The Royal Malaysian Navy: Gearing Up for the 1990s,” Asian Defence Journal (August 1986): 6. 
68 Ibid.; 10. 
69 Joris Janssen Lok, “Submarine Plan Put on Hold,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 16, no. 1 (1991): 7.  





cator=true; Lok, “Submarine Plan Put on Hold,” 7; “S’pore Joins Region in Acquiring Submarines to 





71 Quoted in Lok, “Submarine Plan Put on Hold,” 7. 
 23 
Arrangements (FPDA)—once the U.S. military presence waned in the late 1980s—
precluded the immediate need for large military expenditures to counter external threats, 
and submarines by extension, because the external threat was not significant enough to 
mandate large indigenous purchases.72 Although the 1979 Peta Baru increased the 
importance of the maritime domain it had not yet elevated to the level that would have 
made submarines a critical asset worthy of the high cost. The FPDA for its own sake 
was—and still is—the set of arrangements that enabled a political-military dialogue 
among the member states of Singapore, Malaysia, the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand 
if the external security of Malaysia or Singapore was threatened. Although the 
arrangements failed to explicitly guarantee military intervention, it nonetheless provided 
a forum to discuss threats to Malaysia with foreign powers possessing more robust 
militaries and placed less strain on the Malaysian military to provide for its own 
defense.73 Making matters worse in the 1980s, economic setbacks put any purchase of 
submarines even further out of reach.74  
In the face of U.S. disengagement in the late 1980s, what did this mean for 
Malaysia? In an August 1991 interview, then-Malaysian defense minister Mohamed 
Najib Abdul Razak argued that “the gradual withdrawal of American forces from the 
region makes it necessary for us to stand on our own feet in terms of defence…[and] the 
[FPDA] are very relevant in this context [because] they are still a good going concern 
which provide us with a security umbrella.”75 Taking Mr. Najib’s statement in 
conjunction with statements made by Admiral Wahab in a 1990 interview, in which he 
argued that submarines were necessary to advance “forward defense”—read deterrence—
the implicit guarantees provided by the U.S. and FPDA made the immediate acquisition 
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of submarines avoidable until financial resources were available.76 In other words, 
planners recognized that submarines were necessary for deterrence in the future but put 
off their purchase in view of implicit security guarantees. 
C. POST–COLD WAR ERA 
In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Malaysia failed to develop a 
submarine program because of the financial constraints of the 1980s, which carried over 
into the 1990s. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis marked a further setback. In light of 
these financial constraints, the Malaysian navy continued training its sailors overseas and 
expanded its network of training and purchasing partners to more than a half dozen 
suitors, including Australia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, the Netherlands, Great Britain, 
Sweden, France, and the recently-reformed Russia.77 Entering the new millennium, 
however, negotiations picked up steam and Malaysia was on the verge of signing its first 
submarine deal. 
In 2001, France gained the lead in submarine negotiations with Malaysia and 
bested offers from Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Until this 
development, several states provided compelling proposals to Malaysian defense 
planners. Sweden’s proposal from its Kockums shipyard gave way to an offer for second-
hand Type-209 hulls from Germany’s Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) shipyard; 
Turkey offered Type-209 submarines as well as a joint new-build program; the 
Netherlands made a strong case for two of its Zwaardvis-class submarines —bringing 
them to Malaysia as part of the sales pitch—and for new construction of Moray-class 
submarines at its Rotterdamsche (RDM) shipyard.78 By November 2001, Jane’s Defence 
Weekly reported that France and Malaysia had entered into the final negotiations for “two 
new Scorpène submarines and a refurbished Agosta-70-class diesel-electric submarine” 
from France’s Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN) shipyard to be built as a joint 
                                                 
76 J. N. Mak, “The Royal Malaysian Navy in a Changing Maritime World: The Challenges Ahead,” 
Naval Forces 11, no. 3 (1990): 73. 
77 McCaffrie, “Submarines for South-east Asia,” 35; “S’pore joins region in acquiring submarines.” 
78 “Malaysia Makes First Submarine Moves, Talks Launched with DCN,” Defense Daily International 
2, no. 15 (2001), ProQuest, http://search.proquest.com/docview/217295707?accountid=12702; J. A. C. 
Lewis, “Malaysia Gets ‘Close’ to French Submarine Deal,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 36, no. 31 (2001): 14. 
 25 
venture with Spain’s Izar shipyard.79 Additionally, the French offer included a second 
Agosta-class submarine as an overseas training platform for Malaysian sailors during the 
construction of the Scorpène submarines.80  
Eventually, in June 2002, Malaysian defense minister Najib Razak announced a 
US$972 million deal with DCN of France at a news conference and confirmed the 
parameters of the deal, which included two new Scorpène submarines, with one hull built 
in France and one in Spain respectively, and two used Agosta submarines for training.81 
One significant element of the French deal, however, was that about half the cost of the 
deal was scheduled to be paid in Malaysian commodities, allowing it to avoid a large 
cash payment.82 Specifically, Najib confirmed that Malaysia would sell more than €230 
million worth of palm oil to France and accept more than €130 million in French 
investment.83 In total, the deal was worth approximately US$2.2 billion when 
considering the cost of the platforms themselves and the weapons and training required to 
sustain the submarines.84  
In the post–Cold War environment, the Malaysian rationale for pursuing 
submarine technology has remained relatively constant from the imperatives that were 
first articulated in the 1980s. For example, in an August 1991 interview, Malaysian 
defense minister Najib explained the value of the South China Sea (SCS): “It is very 
important for us because of its security impact and…given this importance, we have 
realized that our military capabilities, naval and air, are very limited…so we must build 
up our capability in that area to ensure that our strategic interests are protected.”85 In his 
second stint as the Defense Minister in 2002, Najib made a remarkably similar statement, 
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this time more direct in the rationale for submarines: “We have such a large body of 
water to police…[and] need submarines because it is a force multiplier; they can appear 
anywhere and because they are stealth [sic]…that makes our deterrent value much 
higher.”86 These statements, taken ten years apart and in different geostrategic 
environments, remain relatively unchanged and emphasize the tremendous challenge for 
the RMN to extend its military influence. Thus, the value of submarines was and is for 
deterrence. 
Second, the more pointed threat of China in the SCS is an even greater concern 
than it was in the 1980s and early 1990s and reinforces the idea that, in an environment of 
U.S.-Soviet disengagement, submarines can be a deterrent to a vastly superior naval 
opponent. According to J. N. Mak in a 1990 Naval Forces article, Admiral Wahab 
impressed upon the author that China and other regional powers “are potential threats 
‘because they have the (naval) capability,’” and furthermore, as Mak asserted, that 
“should a naval confrontation arise…with, for example, the Chinese Navy, the RMN will 
be overwhelmed.”87 This rationale by Admiral Wahab, advanced by Mak, made the more 
pointed charge that China would emerge from the disengagement of the great powers and 
leverage its regional standing using its navy to disable the RMN from responding in kind. 
This fear has largely been realized, especially in the last decade, as China has asserted 
itself in the SCS without an equivalent regional military challenger.  
Yet, Malaysia publicly downplays the threat posed by China and avoids wholesale 
endorsement of U.S. policies in the region to avoid escalation; however, this may not 
reflect private reservations vis-à-vis China in the SCS that may have encouraged the 
purchase of submarines.88 When speaking on increased U.S. engagement in the region, 
current Prime Minister Najib, the twice-former defense minister, asserted “our position is 
we do not want any development that could undermine this region as a region of peace 
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and stability nor anything that would increase tension in the region.”89 In that sense, 
Najib acknowledged that antagonizing China was not in the best interest of Malaysia but 
failed to confess Malaysian naval weakness in the SCS to contest Chinese assertiveness. 
Thus, acquiring submarines would allow the RMN to offer a credible deterrent to China 
without directly challenging the Chinese People’s Liberation Army-in the SCS.90 Adding 
credence to the China deterrence hypothesis, Malaysia has stationed its submarines in 
eastern Sabah with convenient access to the SCS.91 
The post–Cold War environment lacks credible evidence to support the 
enforcement and prestige hypotheses as rationales for Malaysia to pursue submarines, 
and the statements made by prominent defense officials and military leaders lack the 
language that would suggest that submarines were pursued over a thirty-year period for 
enforcement or prestige purposes. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Deterrence was the most likely rationale for Malaysian submarine purchases made 
after the end of Cold War. The Malaysian military imperative to protect the state’s 
maritime interests in the South China Sea likely increased support for the development of 
a submarine fleet to deter states that could threaten Malaysian interests. Furthermore, the 
threat of China, downplayed publicly by Malaysia, may play into the private defense 
calculations of Malaysian defense planners and may have been part of the rationale for 
the purchase of Scorpène-class submarines.  
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 65–73.
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Singapore, the second submarine operator in Southeast Asia, is an interesting case 
study for undersea proliferation. Singapore’s small size makes it curious that in the new 
millennium it procured a total of seven submarines from Sweden and two from 
Germany—acquiring more hulls than its much larger neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
combined.92 Although Singapore negotiated for and took delivery of its first submarine 
well after the end of the Cold War, its defense psychology and patterns of military 
spending prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union provide clarity into its submarine 
purchases 
B. BACKGROUND/COLD WAR ERA 
According to a Ministry of Defense publication, the first exploration of 
submarines was modest at best: “Singapore embarked on its submarine journey when 
eight RSN officers were sent to Eckernforde in Germany for a three week course in the 
late 80s.”93 Yet, the training failed to lead to any negotiations during the Cold War. The 
lack of submarine-seeking behavior by Singapore during the Cold War, save sending a 
handful of officers to Germany, is likely a result of multilateral security guarantees and 
the subordination of the RSN to the air force and army, both in its role and in the defense 
budget. Despite these constraints to submarine purchases, the defense environment 
established during the Cold War enabled the military to explore, and eventually purchase, 
submarines as part of the RSN fleet in later years. 
First, like its neighbor, Malaysia, Singapore was party to the implicit security 
guarantees afforded by the 1971 FPDA, which allowed the state to spend its military 
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budget on other assets, namely for the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF). The 
FPDA provided a multilateral forum, including the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand as 
the other parties, for a political-military dialogue in the event that Singapore or Malaysia 
faced an external threat.94 The FPDA did not guarantee that the other parties would 
intervene militarily on behalf of Singapore, however, the involvement of major powers 
ensured that they would be consulted and engaged in the event of crisis and prevented 
submarines from gaining prominence as a necessary defense asset for the Republic of 
Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). According to one analyst, the FPDA’s significance in 
this regard was that “the FPDA was an important construct and confidence building 
measure for the continued involvement of Commonwealth forces.”95 
Second, aside from multilateral engagement, the FPDA created the Integrated Air 
Defense System (IADS) as part of the agreement, which provided for an Australian 
presence in Singaporean and Malaysian airspace under the command of an Australian Air 
Force officer stationed in Butterworth, Malaysia.96 Under the agreement, member states 
would contribute personnel and assets for general air defense, although not explicitly to 
defend Singapore, which likely contributed to Singaporean defense planners’ decision to 
invest heavily in the RSAF as part of the agreement. Undeniably, Singapore boasted the 
most capable air force within ASEAN in the span of a decade after IADS came into 
force—with more aircraft than Malaysia and Indonesia combined—and showed no signs 
of slowing investment in the RSAF.97 Thus, the necessity of the RSAF and the spending 
required to increase its capacity left the RSN as a secondary defense service and its 
meager budget left little room to entertain submarines as a possibility.98 
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The security situation of Singapore during the Cold War, however, was delicate 
because its former security guarantor, Great Britain, retreated from the region and was 
replaced with a loose guarantee of security built on engagement. Yet, the emergence of 
the RSAF reflected the state’s commitment to defense that is significant for later naval 
developments and shaped its defensive philosophy—the poisonous shrimp. Accordingly, 
the poisonous shrimp mindset required that “Singapore’s forces should be sufficiently 
powerful to deter any regional power from trying to eliminate Singapore, simply by 
making the price too high.”99 The sentiment was echoed by former Minister for Defense 
Yeo Ning Hong: “we are going to make absolutely sure that anybody who attempts to 
swallow us is going to get a fishbone that will perforate their throats.”100 In short, 
Singapore was committed to building its own military and would avoid relying 
completely on its partners for defense, and the result was clear: by the end of the Cold 
War, Singapore was estimated to have allocated 6 percent of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) to defense—almost double that of most NATO members.101 The poisonous 
shrimp would become deadlier after the Cold War ended. 
C. POST–COLD WAR ERA 
Singapore’s failure to acquire submarines prior to 1991 was accompanied by 
statements from defense officials and spending during the era that predicted that 
submarines would likely be pursued in the future to promote seaward defense hundreds, 
or even thousands, of miles from Singapore’s coast because “if the enemy has reached 
the causeway it’s too late.”102 In light of the realization in the 1980s that a coastal defense 
force was insufficient, the RSN decided to expand its reach in the post–Cold War period 
with assets that could perform missions farther from the Singaporean coastline and 
immediate sea lanes. In 1997, then-Chief of the Navy Rear Admiral Richard Lim 
explained the new environment the RSN found itself in: “the end of the Cold War has 
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given rise to a new strategic situation…that is beyond our control; so we do not, we 
cannot, simply wring our hands and hope—we have to go out there and grab it by the 
horns.”103 Admiral Lim was speaking roughly two years after Singapore signed its first 
submarine deal with Sweden, and reflected the Singaporean position that it must 
continuously find ways to improve its security via the military and make the poisonous 
shrimp philosophy relevant in a more uncertain environment. 
In the early 1990s, Singapore again sent naval officers to Germany for training, 
but this time also entertained offers for submarines from Australia, Germany, and 
Sweden.104 By the summer of 1993, Australia appeared to be in the lead to sell Singapore 
its Collins-class, Type 471 submarines built by the Australian Submarine Corporation 
(ASC); however, Swedish submarine builder, Kockums, which owned the majority stake 
in the ASC, blocked the move on the grounds that the ASC had negotiated without the 
consent of the Swedish government.105 In 1995, Singapore publicly expressed that it 
wanted submarines for research purposes and considered a German proposal for a 
submarine-training program and possibly second-hand hulls, coming close to a deal for 
four submarines.106 Responding to July 1995 reports that a German deal was imminent, 
Minister for Defense Dr. Lee Boon Yang argued, “it’s still quite a long time off.”107 
Lee’s statement was accurate in that the German deal never materialized; however, his 
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timeline was a bit off and scarcely two months later his successor as Minister for Defense 
announced that Singapore agreed to terms of a submarine deal with Sweden.108 
In September 1995, Singaporean minister for defense Dr. Tony Tan formally 
outlined the submarine deal with Kockums that included training for approximately 40 
Singaporean sailors in Sweden and a second-hand Sjöormen-class submarine to be used 
in the training process.109 Singapore touted the deal as exploratory and undertaken with 
the express purpose of “learn[ing] more about submarine operations and how they add to 
the capabilities of the RSN’s fleet.”110 Less than two years later, and after the success of 
its training efforts in Sweden, Singapore purchased three more of the Sjöormen 
submarines as an “opportunity buy” according to Tan, later classifying the submarines as 
the Challenger-class in the RSN.111 A fifth hull was also procured for spare parts.112 
The RSN has since made two submarine deals to replace its Challenger hulls and 
agreed to terms for two second-hand Västergötland-class boats from Sweden in 2005—
later renamed the Archer-class—and two new-build Type 218SG submarines from 
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) in Germany in 2013.113 The four newest boats 
were equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), which allows the submarines to 
stay submerged for prolonged periods of time and thus increase the range and 
sustainability of the platforms.114 In less than twenty years, Singapore managed to 
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purchase a total of nine submarines after the RSN had never submerged a submarine of 
its own. 
Motivations during each stage of submarine acquisitions have evolved from an 
exploratory study into the development a capable fleet with an advanced propulsion plant 
and combat systems suite that could hardly be deemed experimental. Beginning in 1995, 
the rationale for entertaining the purchase of or training on submarines was presented as 
benign and straightforward by then-Minister for Defense Lee: “submarine warfare is 
something that is so new to the RSN that we won’t even know where to begin in terms of 
specifying or identifying what submarine is suitable for us.”115 Two months after Lee’s 
statement, his successor, Tan clarified that if submarines were integrated into the RSN 
down the line then it would be to balance the force to better respond to a variety of 
roles—which could include deterrence and enforcement of its critical waterways.116 
Echoing Tan’s statement, RSN Head of Naval Plans Colonel Simon Ong stated in 1997 
“the RSN is evaluating the possibility of developing a submarine capability in the long 
term, as part of our efforts to build a navy with all-round capabilities.”117 Taking these 
statements together, it is difficult to determine the rationale for the purchase of 
Singapore’s first hulls—the Challenger-class—and the purchase added an undersea 
element that was previously absent. Submarines are a deterrent when they are known or 
suspected to be lurking but could also be an enforcement platform in Singapore’s case 
because of the proximity and significance of its waterways. Lee, when discussing the 
purchase of the Challenger hulls, added: “the economy is doing well and it is a cheap sub 
[and] its purchase will still be within the 5 per cent of GDP assigned to defense; so why 
not use it for some training?”118 The purchase and maintenance of a submarine—or 
four—even for training, is quite an expensive training aid. Nevertheless, Singaporean 
defense planners decided that the cost was worthwhile. 
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The RSN evolved into what Singapore deemed its 3G Navy, whereby the RSN 
modernized and added hardware to its fleet to cover the spectrum of missions that 
Singapore required of its military. Speaking on the RSN and submarines in 2009, Chief 
of the Navy Rear Admiral Chew Men Leong explained that “the RSN is currently in the 
midst of realizing its capabilities as the [3G] navy” and that submarines, in this context, 
“have enabled the RSN to build a Navy with balanced capabilities, particularly in the 
underwater dimension.”119 When asked why AIP, a significant advancement from 
traditional diesel-electric submarines, was necessary for the Archer-class submarines, 
Admiral Chew deflected the question and spoke more generally about adding more 
advanced hulls: “When integrated into the RSN, they will form the sharp edge of our 
strike capability and strengthen our deterrent edge.”120 Thus, it can be argued that the 
purchase of AIP submarines, specifically the Archer-class and the latest German Type 
218SG hulls, are intended primarily as deterrence platforms when considering the stealth 
and endurance capabilities of AIP and Admiral Chew’s statements. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The purchase of AIP submarines, and submarines more generally, best fit into the 
category of deterrence purchases for Singapore. The Cold War geopolitical position eased 
after the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the rise of other state and non-state threats in 
its place supports Singapore’s poisonous shrimp deterrence philosophy of yesteryear that 
arguably continued into the new millennium, packaged as building a 3G Navy that can 
both deter enemies and combat disruptions to commerce. Using either name, the bottom 
line is that the strategic vulnerability of Singapore has not changed over time—the 
borders are still the same, its neighbors still large, and its geographical significance has 
only increased since independence in 1965. Indeed, Singapore still needs to be a 
poisonous shrimp, and the deterrence that a robust submarine fleet provides may very 
well be the fishbone to an enemy’s throat that Minister for Defense Yeo described. 
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United Vietnam, and divided North and South Vietnam before it, was actively 
engaged in combat throughout the Cold War and was unable to engage in robust 
negotiations for new military hardware, save the military aid that came from the United 
States and Soviet Union at varying points during the Cold War era. After the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Vietnam embarked on a path of military modernization that included 
the eventual purchase of submarines. Although Vietnam was the latest on the scene with 
respect to submarine acquisitions, it will have the largest submarine fleet in Southeast 
Asia once it takes delivery of its six submarines that were purchased in 2009.121 
B. BACKGROUND/COLD WAR ERA 
Vietnam, both in its unified and divided form, expended most of its military 
energy during the Cold War era fighting one enemy or another, whether it was France, 
the United States, Cambodia—or the North versus the South—and combat operations 
prevented military planners from investing their collective energy in entertaining offers 
for advanced military hardware like submarines. Yet, after Vietnam concluded its war in 
Cambodia and regional hostilities had cooled, Soviet submarines began to appear in Cam 
Ranh Bay as early as 1979 and the question of then united Vietnam’s interest in 
submarines began to surface.122 At the time, the arrival of a Soviet submarine was 
perhaps the Soviets leveraging a naval base of a friendly Communist ally to build up its 
regional military presence; however, as of 1985, it appeared more likely that the Soviets 
were also training Vietnamese submariners, made more apparent by the arrival of 
additional Whiskey-class Soviet submarines.123 By the close of the Cold War, Vietnam 
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had yet to purchase a single hull—regardless of any favorable Soviet deal that could have 
been offered—because of financial constraints.124 
The late-Cold War Soviet submarine staging in Cam Ranh Bay developed an 
indigenous Vietnamese interest in submarines that manifested itself via the training of 
Vietnamese submariners, which the Soviet Union was willing to provide to its ally in 
exchange for the use of Vietnamese ports. According to some analysts, Soviet support for 
Vietnamese submarines—and the staging of Soviet hulls—during the Cold War was seen 
as an opportunity for the Soviet Union to not only position naval assets in Southeast Asia 
but also to develop a regional proxy, much like Moscow had developed in Cuba.125 
Vietnam itself avoided confirming its submarine ambitions when the Soviet submarine 
presence increased; however, its relations with China would have implications in the 
post–Cold War environment and Vietnam’s decision to eventually purchase submarines. 
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea among several claimant states, 
including Vietnam and China, led to the militarization of these disputes beginning in the 
1970s and, by the end of Cold War, open animosity between China and Vietnam. These 
trends may have encouraged Vietnamese support for Soviet submarine training in the 
mid-1980s. As early as 1974, China and then-South Vietnam began to assert more public 
claims to the Paracel and Spratly Island chains, culminating in the exchange of gunfire 
and killing of Vietnamese soldiers.126 In 1988, tensions over China’s build-up in the 
Spratly Islands resulted in a confrontation that killed as many as 70 Vietnamese soldiers 
and sailors.127 The tension that began to percolate in the South China Sea in parallel with 
Soviet-sponsored submarine training would carry over into the post–Cold War 
environment. 
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C. POST–COLD WAR ERA 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam’s major military supplier, 
Vietnam was on its way to acquiring submarines after decades of warfare and budget 
constraints had previously prevented it from doing so.128 As early as the late 1990s, 
Vietnam was reported to have taken delivery of two mini North Korean Yugo-class 
submarines, although neither the terms of the deal nor the acquisition were publicly 
confirmed and the operational feasibility of the two platforms was in doubt.129 A decade 
after acquiring the mini submarines, details of a deal for six Kilo-class hulls from Russia 
began to surface and were later confirmed in December 2009 when Vietnamese Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung visited Moscow.130 The terms of the deal were for six Project 
636MV/Kilo-class submarines built by Russia’s Admiralty Shipyard to be delivered at a 
cost of approximately US$1.8 billion, with one new hull delivered per year once 
construction was complete.131 Unlike the Russian Kilo-class submarines sold to China in 
2002, specifically the Project 636-class nomenclature, the updated variant sold to the 
Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN), labeled the Project 636MV-class, is considered more 
advanced and is outfitted with the latest anti-ship missile, radar, and sonar technology 
compared to the earlier Chinese hulls.132 As of the time of this writing, the VPN has 
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taken delivery of four of its six submarines: HQ-182 Hanoi, HQ-183 Ho Chi Minh City, 
HQ-184 Hai Phong, and HQ-185 Khanh Hoa.133 
The rationale for Vietnam’s submarine purchases is widely attributed to the 
asymmetric naval threat posed by the PLAN in the South China Sea, which have the 
potential to become further militarized. In other words, Vietnam purchased submarines 
for deterrence against a more aggressive China in the South China Sea maritime 
territorial disputes.134  
Statements made by Vietnam’s defense minister, Phung Quang Thanh, in 2011 
attempted to deflect the deterrence rationale but he was ineffective in denying the anti-
Chinese imperative. Shortly after Vietnam agreed to its first significant submarine deal, 
Phung asserted that the deal was “definitely not meant as a menace to regional 
nations.”135 Yet, Phung also argued that the submarines were purchased “‘completely in 
self-defense’ though Hanoi would act to deter anyone who tried to compromise its 
sovereignty.”136 In other words, the Defense Minister argued that the Kilo deal was not 
aimed at China specifically but that the submarines would act as a deterrent against states 
that violated what Vietnam perceived as its sovereignty, or in this case claims of 
sovereign territory in the South China Sea. In short, Phung failed to mention China by 
name but signaled that the purchase was aimed generically at regional threats—of which 
China is the biggest source. 
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The second argument that supports the deterrence rationale for purchasing 
submarines in conjunction with Defense Minister Phung’s statements is the state’s 
definition of its sovereign territory itself. Vietnam, like China, considers itself the rightful 
sovereign over the entirety of the Paracel and Spratly Islands and views competing claims 
to the territories as illegitimate and furthermore a violation of its sovereignty.137 Between 
2009—before Vietnam formalized its submarine deal with Russia—and the fall of 2010, 
several incidents at sea and political moves by China, including fishing bans and seismic 
exploration surveys, prompted Vietnam to make formal statements in response.138 
Specifically, in August 2010, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Nguyen 
Phuong Nga issued a statement on the Chinese activities in the South China Sea: 
“Vietnam demands that China immediately cease and stop the recurrence of these 
violations of Vietnam’s sovereignty.”139 The statement by Nguyen came roughly one 
year before Phung explained that the submarine deal was for self-defense and deterrence 
against violations of sovereignty. It is difficult to argue that the timing of the submarine 
deal in parallel with these statements was for an alternative purpose. 
Third, the purchase of submarines as part of the larger package of military 
hardware that Vietnam purchased from Russia was aimed to counter a large asymmetric 
surface naval threat, made apparent both by the types of hardware and the anti-ship 
weapons that each platform employs. In the case of VPN’s growing fleet of Project 
636MV hulls, the threat of a lurking submarine is enough to deter a much larger surface 
naval threat.140 In addition to its submarines, the menu of military hardware that Vietnam 
purchased that is significant to this research are the platforms equipped with anti-ship 
missiles: strike aircraft, coastal patrol vessels, and frigates, which are all a part of an anti-
access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy.141 Yet, even if Vietnam were able to double its 
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purchase of aircraft and ships, it would be unable to counter the superior PLAN force.142 
This is where the purchase of submarines becomes significant.  
According to one analysis, “China is developing a powerful submarine force to 
form an ‘unsymmetrical superiority’” vis-à-vis the U.S. and “Vietnam is likely learning 
from China in forming an ‘unsymmetrical superiority’” against its own adversary in 
China—perhaps one attraction to the more advanced Kilo submarine that it purchased 
from Russia.143 According to another analysis, expanding on the A2/AD concept, 
submarines are force multipliers that make up for the numerical disadvantage of the VPN 
compared to the PLAN:  
Vietnam’s acquisition of a significant submarine force has been a way to 
develop an interim deterrent capability rapidly. This can be used to 
enforce, and if needed, contest its sovereignty in the South China Sea. 
Even with the operationalization of all its recent surface platform 
acquisitions, the VPN will still be significantly inferior to China’s naval 
forces; the ability to deploy submarines provides the VPN with a means to 
undertake a sea denial strategy against China in the disputed territory, 
instead of having to go head-to-head in a naval conflict.144 
The alternative hypotheses that this thesis explores are less convincing in the 
Vietnamese case compared to the evidence that supports the deterrence imperative. First, 
there is little evidence to support enforcement as a rationale for purchasing submarines, 
even if there is a need for enforcement more generally. Instead, Vietnam is interested in 
claiming and maintaining sovereignty over the contested maritime domain of the Spratly 
and Paracel island chains. Second, the prestige imperative to explain submarine 
purchases is largely absent in statements made by Vietnamese officials. Aside from the 
normal pomp and circumstance seen during the commissioning of new ships, the new 
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Vietnamese submarines are not being publicly promoted as an asset to boost the VPN’s 
image internally or abroad. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The post–Cold War environment failed to sever the diplomatic and military 
relationship between Moscow and Hanoi, and the partnership reached its pinnacle with 
the 2009 submarine deal. Vietnam’s purchase of six advanced Kilo-class submarines was 
widely described as a deterrent response to China’s military superiority over Vietnam in 
the context of the maritime disputes between the two states. The evidence strongly 
supports the imperative of this asymmetrical response. Vietnamese defense officials were 
unable to offer a compelling counter-narrative to champions of the deterrence hypothesis 
that would better explain the rationale for this largest purchase of submarines in 
Southeast Asia in the post–Cold War era. Once Vietnam receives its final two hulls in the 
near future, the operational future of the VPN submarine fleet will likely reflect the 
deterrence rationale. Finally, there is little evidence to support enforcement or prestige as 
a rationale for submarine purchases as reflected in statements made by Vietnamese 
defense and Communist Party officials in the lead-up to and aftermath of the 
announcement of the submarine deal. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. REGIONAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS DURING POST–COLD WAR 
ERA 
The cascade of military technology that proliferated after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked an era of evolving militaries and defense 
apparatuses that both reflected existing vulnerabilities and posed future sources of conflict. 
The purchase of submarines, however, created an exponential increase in military 
capability that necessitated its own body of research. The case studies of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam provided evidence that supported or refuted the 
hypotheses of deterrence, enforcement, and prestige as rationales for submarine purchases. 
1. Deterrence 
Perhaps the strongest hypothesis that was supported by each case study this thesis 
examined was deterrence. The end of the Cold War saw the Soviet Union retreat from its 
overseas activities and the United States respond with similar disengagement. Thereafter, 
new and improved military hardware and armament were necessary to ensure the state 
security. Specifically, in each of the case studies, defense officials made statements that 
reflected deterrence-minded rationales for the purchase of submarines to convince an 
adversary not to engage in undesirable military activity. Furthermore, the deterrence 
argument appears to be a regional pattern with respect to submarine proliferation. For 
example, although the Philippines lacks its own submarine fleet, Philippine Vice Admiral 
Jesus C. Millan confirmed that it began research as early as 2011 to field an indigenous 
submarine fleet with designs on countering Chinese aggressiveness in the South China Sea, 
which degraded the Philippine position in the Scarborough Shoal in 2012.145  
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The supporting evidence for enforcement as a rationale for submarine purchases 
was weak, and even then only seen in the Indonesian case. For Indonesia, enforcement 
using submarines was perceived as necessary for the state to demonstrate its resolve to 
patrol its waterways and disputed maritime area. In the territorial dispute between 
Indonesia and Malaysia in particular, the dispute was legally resolved but still festers in 
the Indonesian psyche. Malaysia, however, considers the dispute settled with Indonesia 
and has made no statements that would indicate it sought submarines for enforcement. 
Vietnam, on the other hand, is actively engaged in a longstanding territorial dispute with 
China but is past the point of enforcing its claim and appears to have moved directly to 
deterrence, which required the purchase of submarines for this purpose instead of for the 
dual rationales of deterrence and enforcement.  
3. Prestige 
The hypothesis that states purchased submarines primarily for prestige lacks 
empirical evidence among these case studies to support that hypothesis. Although states 
such as Indonesia may have purchased submarines for prestige in the late 1970s, the 
security and financial environment of the post–Cold War period demanded that states 
carefully consider each purchase, and prestige was difficult to use as a guiding rationale 
for submarine purchases. 
In the Southeast Asian case studies of this thesis, prestige rationales—if they even 
existed—for submarine purchases in the aftermath of the Cold War were swiftly met by 
the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. The dramatic contraction of the economies and 
GDPs in Southeast Asia forced politicians, economists, and defense planners alike to 
rethink their pre-crisis strategies and mandated more conservative models of budgeting 
and spending.146 Thus, defense officials in the case studies herein avoided articulating 
their states’ positions for submarine purchases for prestige, but instead for more critical 
rationales of deterrence and enforcement. Furthermore, future submarine proliferation 
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examples from the region provide salient evidence that there is a regional aversion to 
spending predicated on prestige. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SUBMARINE ACQUISITIONS 
Regional patterns for submarine proliferation in Southeast Asia can illuminate 
future undersea developments in the region and highlight the strength of the deterrence 
and enforcement arguments. In the case of the Philippines, as mentioned earlier, the state 
is embroiled in a maritime territorial dispute with China, with which it has a military 
asymmetry. Like Vietnam, a Philippine rationale for purchasing submarine would likely 
be to deter China from further strengthening its maritime position at the expense of the 
Philippines.  
In another future proliferation example, Thailand is also considering the purchase 
of submarines. Its domestic dialogue offers a real time look at the competing hypotheses 
that this thesis explored.147 The Thai government is considering the purchase of three 
Chinese-made submarines for territorial defense, but many in Thailand instead see the 
purchase as one of prestige and as an opportunity to appeal to the Chinese.148 In 
particular, Admiral Narongphon Na Bang Chang stated, “Thailand needs submarines to 
make other countries stand in awe.”149 The admiral’s argument is under heavy domestic 
scrutiny because many Thais argue that prestige is an insufficient rationale to spend large 
amounts of money and because the end of the Cold War has been a peaceful time for the 
state, devoid of threats that would mandate deterrence or enforcement imperatives to buy 
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submarines.150 Furthermore, according to one analyst, the purchase could actually be 
counterproductive: “The Thai elite knows very well that Vietnam built up its military 
strength because of conflict in the South China Sea, based on tension with its giant 
neighbor China…[and] Vietnamese submarines cannot be regarded as a threat to 
Thailand; on the contrary, if Thailand purchased submarines from China, it could pose a 
challenge to Hanoi.”151  
The Thai and Philippine cases are yet to be resolved. Yet, both cases provided 
evidence that supports the conclusions of this thesis—that deterrence and enforcement 
are strong rationales in the post–Cold War environment for purchasing submarines, but 
not prestige. Furthermore, the Philippines’ stated rationale to purchase submarines lacks 
formidable opposition because there is a deterrent imperative to do so, and the Thai 
narrative of prestige is under siege from opponents because its deterrent and enforcement 
arguments are weak. In short, future proliferation is most likely when a deterrence or 
enforcement imperative is present, but prestige still has some champions in governments 
that assert it is a worthwhile rationale to purchase submarines for their broader political 
value. 
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